NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

16 December 1976

SECRET

25X1

Intelligence Community Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Langely, Virginia

Dear Tom,

I appreciate the opportunity to review Cord Meyer's 12 October proposal for improving crisis management within the Intelligence Community. While I support most initiatives which contribute to more coherent Community-wide crisis management, I believe the strong weight in this proposal on coordination of collection activities balanced by notably less emphasis on coordinated substantive analysis is wide of the mark and may even prove counter-productive. As I recall, recent crises post-mortems identified the primary intelligence shortfall to be inadequate analysis (particularly predictive analysis) and reporting, not data collection. Complaints of too much factual or event reporting (e.g., "the SIGINT din") which is the direct product of collection, suggest in fact that the collection systems functioned relatively well. What the Community does not need is another staff layer which concerns itself with line resource manager responsibilities that can be executed effectively only by the line manager. In this respect, it is very useful to observe that the Pentagon's CCF was reoriented for primary attention to prioritization and levy of time sensitive information requirements, thereby departing from the initial DIA central thrust that it function as a DoD centralized controller of collection systems and sensors. Although Cord Meyer's paper addresses many aspects of crises management, I see this same basic flaw which plagued early steps in the CCF venture.

I believe the real need is for a Community Crisis Coordinator who acts for the DCI, the NIOs and NFIB principles to insure that the individual agencies are working toward the same goals as well as cooperating with each other. If this proposal is politically infeasible, however, I suggest that Community performance before and during crises can be enhanced by a Crisis Information Coordinator. This individual would be knowledgeable of collection capabilities but

NSA Review Completed.

SECRET

Classified by DIRNSA/CHCSS (NSA/CSSM 12
Exempt from GDS, EO 11652, Cat 2
Declassify Upon Notification by the Originator

● SECRET ●

would focus on national and departmental information require-
ments before and during a crisis. The individual would
serve as a bridge between the users of intelligence (in-
cluding NIOs) and analysts-reporters and between analysts-
reporters and crisis managers. This process would free NIOs
from worries about collection assets and allow more time for
analysis while concurrently aiding collection managers
direct their assets against specific information sets by
insuring their possession of prioritized information require-
ments.

The idea of a Community checklist is constructive and
should be pursued. The proposed checklist, however, reflects
the same mis-focus as the proposal for a collection coordinator
One would expect, for example, that the advent of a crisis
of significant proportions would be preceded by an IAM.
Relatedly, we cannot depend upon a CRITIC report announcing
the beginning of a crisis. A checklist should also be
approached with caution since there is a distinct danger
that too much detail in a checklist, e.g., with CRITIC shown
as the opening report, will foster a mind set which does not
recognize the advent of a crisis simply because the procedural
criteria of the checklist have not been met.

I am prepared to provide any further assistance to this
project that you may consider appropriate and useful.

Sincerely,

CHARLES R. LORD
Chief, Requirements
& Operations Center

SECRET